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THE NEW NATIONAL SECURITY CANON 
STEPHEN I. VLADECK* 
Why have victims of post-September 11 governmental misconduct met with virtually 
no success thus far in pursuing damages claims arising out of the government’s 
alleged abuses?  One explanation is that these cases are nothing more than one piece of 
a larger puzzle in which fewer and fewer civil plaintiffs have been able to recover in 
any suit alleging official misconduct. After all, it is a familiar trope that the Supreme 
Court has shown increasing skepticism in recent years toward civil plaintiffs in 
damages suits against government officers. Complicating matters, because reasonable 
minds continue to disagree about the legality of the surveillance, detention, and 
treatment of terrorism suspects (and a host of other controversial measures) since 
September 11, different perspectives on the underlying legal questions will necessarily 
color our view of whether the absence of relief in these cases is a new—or troubling—
development.  
In this Essay, I aim to provide a deeper answer to this question by looking carefully 
at the evolution of four different general doctrines in federal courts jurisprudence that 
have figured prominently in national security civil suits over the past decade:  the 
availability of Bivens remedies; federal common law defenses to state-law suits against 
government contractors; qualified immunity; and the political question doctrine.   To 
determine whether the lack of recovery in post-September 11 civil litigation differs in 
kind or merely degree from that which is true more generally, I contrast the state of 
these doctrines in non-national security cases with how the same law has been applied 
in suits with national security over- or under-tones. As I conclude, closer inspection 
                                                 
 * Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Scholarship, American University, 
Washington College of Law.  This Essay arose out of remarks delivered at the 
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reveals fairly compelling evidence for the emergence of a new “national security 
canon,” a body of rules unique to national security cases that, at least thus far, all cut 
against allowing relief in suits that might otherwise be able to proceed to judgment. 
Absent a change in direction, this trend will have two sets of consequences: First, 
national security policy will, in most cases, increasingly come to be an area over which 
the political branches exercise near-plenary control (thereby perpetuating, whether 
correctly or not, the argument that courts lack the institutional competence to resolve 
such claims).  Second, as such, we may well come to understand the emergence of the 
national security canon over the past decade as another example of the “normalization 
of the exception”—the accommodation into existing law of practices and policies 
typically embraced only by virtue of their exigency and fleeting duration. As the 
national security canon becomes more deeply ingrained, so too the likelihood that it 
will expand into contexts other than those in which it has thus far been recognized. 
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INTRODUCTION 
As of May 2012, not a single damages judgment has been awarded 
in any of the dozens of lawsuits arising out of post-September 11 U.S. 
counterterrorism policies alleging violations of plaintiffs’ individual 
rights.1  For some, this result simply testifies to the thoughtfulness 
and care with which the government has conducted the “war on 
terrorism”; it follows that there is no need for damages if no rights 
                                                 
 1. Obviously, this figure does not take into account suits in which settlements 
were reached—a set that is certainly not empty.  Nor does it include pending cases 
where the current posture supports recovery for the plaintiff.  Rather, the question is 
simply whether any court has awarded damages in a challenge to a post-September 
11 counterterrorism or other national security initiative.  So far, the answer has been 
no. See Developments in the Law—Access to Courts, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1151, 1159 (2009) 
(describing how no torture cases against the United States have moved past summary 
judgment). 
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have actually been violated.2  For others, this outcome is a function 
less of the legality of the government’s conduct than the novelty of the 
measures adopted after September 11—and the corresponding idea 
that, whether or not the government crossed the line, the law was not 
“clearly established” such that individual officers should be held 
liable for whatever transgressions may have occurred.3  Still, others 
take a more cynical view, seeing in this body of jurisprudence a 
systematic effort to create a form of functional impunity—a creation 
of new doctrinal barriers to relief that deny recovery even where 
extant precedent would otherwise appear to have supported it.4 
Assessing who has the better of this argument is a difficult 
endeavor.  For starters, it is now a familiar trope that the Supreme 
Court has shown increasing hostility toward civil plaintiffs in most 
damages suits against government officers—and not just those 
implicating national security policies.5  Whatever fealty the Warren 
and early Burger Courts may have demonstrated toward suits 
challenging official action, it can hardly be gainsaid that the 
Rehnquist and Roberts Courts have systematically made it more 
difficult for civil plaintiffs to obtain damages in cases arising out of 
governmental misconduct.6  In that vein, the absence of meritorious 
damages claims arising out of counterterrorism initiatives may merely 
be part of a larger pattern in which fewer and fewer civil plaintiffs 
                                                 
 2. See, e.g., Rasul v. Myers, 512 F.3d 644, 663–67 (D.C. Cir.) (rejecting a Bivens 
claim for damages brought by a former Guantanamo detainee after finding that he 
had qualified immunity), vacated, 555 U.S. 1083 (2008), reinstated on remand, 563 F.3d 
527 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1013 (2009). 
 3. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2083–84 (2011) (concluding that 
in order for a government officer to be liable in damages actions, his conduct must 
have violated “clearly established” law of which a reasonable officer in his position 
knew or should have known). 
 4. See, e.g., Elizabeth A. Wilson, “Damages or Nothing”:  The Post-Boumediene 
Constitution and Compensation for Human Rights Violations After 9/11, 41 SETON HALL L. 
REV. 1491, 1492–93 (2011) (describing how the outcomes of many post-Boumediene 
cases have been determined solely by the impact of immigration law and not with 
reference to actual culpability). 
 5. See Andrew M. Siegel, The Court Against the Courts:  Hostility to Litigation as an 
Organizing Theme in the Rehnquist Court’s Jurisprudence, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1097, 1106–07 
(2006) (asserting that the current Court has a particular disdain for litigation and 
has “tightened the conditions under which successful litigants can recover damages 
or attorney’s fees” in suits against the government); see also Daniel J. Meltzer, The 
Supreme Court’s Judicial Passivity, 2002 SUP. CT. REV. 343, 356–62 (identifying a similar 
pattern); Judith Resnik, Constricting Remedies:  The Rehnquist Judiciary, Congress, and 
Federal Power, 78 IND. L.J. 223, 224 (2003) (arguing that the Rehnquist Court was 
unwilling to create remedies without explicit congressional permission). 
 6. See Gary S. Gildin, The Supreme Court’s Legislative Agenda to Free Government From 
Accountability for Constitutional Deprivations, 114 PENN ST. L. REV. 1333, 1384 (2010) 
(reviewing the Roberts Court’s § 1983 jurisprudence and concluding that the current 
Court is likely to be hostile to litigants seeking liberalized remedies for victims of 
governmental wrongdoing). 
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have been able to recover in any suit alleging official misconduct.7 
In addition, there is no consensus as to the underlying legality—or 
lack thereof—of much of the challenged governmental conduct in 
national security cases.8  So long as reasonable minds continue to 
disagree about the legality of the surveillance, detention, and 
treatment of terrorism suspects (and a host of other controversial 
measures) since September 11, it can hardly be surprising that 
different perspectives on the underlying legal questions will 
necessarily color our view of whether the absence of relief in these 
cases is a new—or troubling—development.9 
Whereas most of this debate has been couched in terms of 
generalizations, I aim in this Essay to illuminate the conversation with 
specifics—to look carefully at the evolution of four different general 
doctrines in federal courts jurisprudence that have figured 
prominently in national security civil suits over the past decade:  the 
availability of Bivens remedies; federal common law defenses to state-
law suits against government contractors; qualified immunity; and the 
political question doctrine.10  To determine whether the lack of 
                                                 
 7. Indeed, such reasoning extends to the Court’s aggressive reinvigoration of 
state sovereign immunity, its reluctance to recognize implied statutory causes of 
action, its narrowing of the scope of federal rights that can be enforced via 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983, and so on.  See Resnik, supra note 5, at 224 (arguing that the current Court 
has been unwilling to grant damages to civil plaintiffs in actions against the 
government absent an explicit congressional mandate). 
 8. To take just one example, there appears to still be disagreement about 
whether the torture of detainees at Abu Ghraib and elsewhere was in fact illegal.  See, 
e.g., Arthur S. Brisbane, The Other Torture Debate, N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 2011, at WK8 
(illustrating that many believed the interrogation methods used post-September 11 
at Abu Ghraib and elsewhere did not amount to torture). 
 9. For a thoughtful take on the role of “hindsight bias” in these cases, see 
generally Peter Margulies, Judging Myopia in Hindsight:  Bivens Actions, National 
Security Decisions, and the Rule of Law, 96 IOWA L. REV. 195 (2010), discussing 
“hindsight bias” in the context of encouraging officials’ innovation through flexible 
approaches to damages claims. 
 10. This list will strike some as arbitrary.  After all, one could easily also include 
the availability of Article III standing in suits challenging national security policies, 
see, e.g., Amnesty Int’l USA v. Clapper, 638 F.3d 118, 121–22 (2d Cir. 2011) (holding 
that petitioner does have Article III standing to challenge the constitutionality of the 
2008 amendments to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978), petition for 
cert. filed, No. 11-1025 (U.S. Feb. 17, 2012), pleading requirements under Rule 8 of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 665 (2009) 
(considering whether the Respondent’s complaint failed to plead sufficient facts to 
state claim as required under Rule 8), or the state secrets privilege, see, e.g., 
Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070, 1073 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc) 
(holding that the state secrets doctrine required the plaintiffs’ challenge to the 
defendant’s role in their extraordinary rendition be dismissed), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 
2442 (2011).  With regard to the first two, however, I do not believe there are clear 
examples of contemporary cases adopting “new” rules in national security cases.  And 
with regard to the state secrets privilege, leaving aside the general oversaturation of 
quality scholarship the topic has already received, two full-length articles, in 
particular, have considered in detail whether post-September 11 developments have 
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recovery in post-September 11 civil litigation differs in kind or merely 
degree from that which is true more generally, I contrast the state of 
these doctrines in non-national security cases with how the same law 
has been applied in suits with national security over- or under-tones.11 
To that end, Part I situates the analysis by providing a capsule 
summary of the state of the canon with respect to each of these 
doctrines on September 10, 2001.  In Part II, I turn to the key 
doctrinal developments since September 11 in each field.  As Part II 
will establish, careful study of the relevant jurisprudence yields three 
significant, but not necessarily consistent, conclusions:  First, in each 
of these four areas, there have been cases in which courts have 
recognized newfound “national security”-based reasons to foreclose 
recovery by plaintiffs.  Second, some of the most profound obstacles to 
recovery have been articulated on more general terms, such that 
their application is not necessarily confined to challenges to 
counterterrorism policies.  Third, virtually all of the national security-
specific rules have been articulated by lower courts, with little more 
than tacit endorsement by the Supreme Court.  In contrast, the Court 
has played a more direct role in identifying some of the more cross-
cutting obstacles to recovery.  Thus, although the emergence of a 
new national security canon has primarily been a project of the lower 
courts, the Supreme Court’s more general constriction of civil 
remedies against government officers may well have emboldened, 
however indirectly, particularly aggressive doctrinal innovation at the 
circuit level.  At the same time, the Court has steadfastly refused to 
address virtually any of the national security-specific doctrinal 
developments, however presented.12 
Finally, in the Conclusion, I turn to the normative implications of 
the trends identified in Part II.  Although I suspect readers will react 
                                                 
been qualitatively different.  Compare Laura K. Donohue, The Shadow of State Secrets, 
159 U. PA. L. REV. 77, 87 (2010) (focusing attention on federal court cases between 
2001 and 2009), with Robert M. Chesney, State Secrets and the Limits of National Security 
Litigation, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1249, 1249 (2007) (using a survey of the origin and 
evolution of the state secrets doctrine to suggest that the Bush Administration did 
not differ qualitatively in its use of the privilege). 
 11. In that regard, this Essay builds off a shorter, earlier piece I wrote focusing 
specifically on the proliferation of amorphous “national security” concerns in Bivens 
litigation.   See Stephen I. Vladeck, National Security and Bivens After Iqbal, 14 LEWIS & 
CLARK L. REV. 255, 257–58 (2010) (suggesting that Bivens remedies can, and should, 
play a meaningful role in national security cases because Bivens likely provides the 
sole means of redress for constitutional violations). 
 12. See, e.g., Stephen I. Vladeck, The Passive-Aggressive Virtues, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 
SIDEBAR 122 (2011) (examining the Supreme Court’s docket in post-September 11 
terrorism cases—and reflecting on the consequences of the Court’s passive-aggressive 
behavior). 
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differently to the emergence of the new national security canon that 
Part II identifies, I anticipate two specific effects going forward:  First, 
absent a change in direction, national security policy will, in most 
cases, increasingly come to be an area over which the political 
branches exercise near-plenary control (thereby perpetuating, 
whether correctly or not, the argument that courts lack the 
institutional competence to resolve such claims).  Second, as such, we 
may well come to understand the emergence of the national security 
canon over the past decade as another example of the “normalization 
of the exception”—the accommodation into existing law of practices 
and policies typically embraced only by virtue of their exigency and 
fleeting duration.13 
I. THE FEDERAL COURTS CANON ON SEPTEMBER 10, 2001 
A. Bivens Remedies 
The doctrinal evolution of Bivens remedies has been well- and 
often-traced.14  Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau 
of Narcotics was a 1971 decision in which the Supreme Court for the 
first time recognized that, in certain circumstances, the Constitution 
itself provides a cause of action for damages for constitutional 
violations by federal officers.15  Thus, in Bivens, the Court recognized 
a damages claim arising out of an alleged Fourth Amendment 
violation, holding that such remedies should be available unless:  (1) 
Congress had displaced them with a comprehensive alternative;16 or 
(2) “special factors counseling hesitation” militated against relief.17  
In that regard, Bivens filled a critical remedial gap, since no federal 
statute provided a general cause of action for obtaining damages for 
constitutional violations by federal—as opposed to state—officers.18  
                                                 
 13. See, e.g., OREN GROSS & FIONNUALA NÍ AOLÁIN, LAW IN TIMES OF CRISIS:  
EMERGENCY POWERS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 236 (2006) (arguing that the 
normalization phenomenon can cause the state to accept controversial emergency 
powers); cf. Harold D. Lasswell, The Garrison State, 46 AM. J. SOC. 455, 457–58 (1941) 
(suggesting that such normalization is inevitable in the modern industrial state). 
 14. For one of the most comprehensive (and recent) examples, see James E. 
Pfander, The Story of Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of 
Narcotics, in FEDERAL COURTS STORIES 275, 295–96 (Vicki C. Jackson & Judith Resnik 
eds., 2010), observing that the Court’s “unsteady” path in Bivens litigation has created 
substantial uncertainty about what Bivens litigants must prove to prevail. 
 15. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 
388, 390 (1971). 
 16. Id. at 397. 
 17. Id. at 396–97. 
 18. At the time, the FTCA did not authorize suits arising out of intentional torts 
or claims not recognized as torts in the law of the state in which they accrued.  See 
generally James E. Pfander & David Baltmanis, Rethinking Bivens:  Legitimacy and 
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Indeed, notwithstanding intervening amendments to the Federal 
Tort Claims Act (FTCA),19 there remains no such statute today.20 
Although Bivens was somewhat controversial, the Court’s first two 
follow-up decisions only expanded its scope.21  Thus, in Davis v. 
Passman,22 the Court extended Bivens to encompass a claim for sex-
based discrimination in violation of the equal protection principles 
enmeshed within the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.23  And 
in Carlson v. Green,24 the Court allowed a Bivens claim to proceed 
against a prison warden based on the claim that the warden had 
denied an inmate access to timely medical care in violation of the 
Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishments.25  
Although the government argued in Green that the FTCA displaced 
Bivens in that case,26 Justice Brennan explained that Congress can 
only oust Bivens if it “provided an alternative remedy which it explicitly 
declared to be a substitute for recovery directly under the 
Constitution and viewed as equally effective,”27 which Congress had 
not so declared in the case of the FTCA.28 
In retrospect, Green was the high-water mark for Bivens remedies.  
In the 32 years since, the Court has not only declined to recognize 
any other constitutional provisions that can be enforced via Bivens, but 
it has shown an unwillingness to apply the three pro-Bivens decisions 
                                                 
Constitutional Adjudication, 98 GEO. L.J. 117, 121 (2009) (providing an overview of the 
history of legislative developments in the wake of Bivens). 
 19. In 1974, Congress amended the intentional tort exception to the FTCA to 
create liability for certain intentional torts for law enforcement officers.  See Pub. L. 
No. 93-253, 88 Stat. 50 (1974) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (2006)).  
And in 1988, Congress in the Westfall Act created a comprehensive scheme for 
substituting the federal government in virtually all state-law tort suits against federal 
officers arising out of the scope of their employment.  See Federal Employees Liability 
Reform and Tort Compensation (Westfall) Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-694, 102 
Stat. 4563, 4564 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b) (2006)).  As Jim Pfander and David 
Baltmanis have argued, these statutes, the legislative history of both of which 
positively discussed Bivens, could be seen as providing at least congressional 
acquiescence in the Supreme Court’s decision.  Pfander & Baltmanis, supra note 18, 
at 131–34. 
 20. But see Akhil Reed Amar, Five Views of Federalism:  “Converse-1983” in Context, 47 
VAND. L. REV. 1229, 1233–36 (1994) (arguing that states should adopt “converse-
1983” statutes, which would create a state-law cause of action for violations of federal 
constitutional rights by federal officers). 
 21. See Pfander, supra note 14, at 295–96 (recounting the Court’s initial 
expansion of Bivens to encompass damages for Equal Protection Clause and Eighth 
Amendment violations). 
 22. 442 U.S. 228 (1979). 
 23. Id. at 230–31. 
 24. 446 U.S. 14 (1980). 
 25. Id. at 16–18. 
 26. Id. at 17–18. 
 27. Id. at 18–19. 
 28. Id. at 19–20 (emphasis added). 
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to even the most minutely different facts.29 
The retrenchment took place simultaneously along two axes—the 
two exceptions Justice Brennan identified in Bivens itself.  Thus, in a 
series of cases beginning in the 1980s, the Court held that various 
federal statutory schemes displaced Bivens relief, even though none 
of those schemes satisfied the requirement from Green that Congress 
have “explicitly declared [the relevant scheme] to be a substitute for 
recovery directly under the Constitution and viewed as equally 
effective.”30  Thus, Bush v. Lucas31 refused to recognize a First 
Amendment retaliation claim arising out of the civil service, based on 
the existence of an internal administrative process under the Civil 
Service Reform Act in which the plaintiff’s constitutional claims were 
“fully cognizable.”32  And the Court in Schweiker v. Chilicky33 rejected 
Bivens relief in a claim alleging a due process violation in the 
processing of federal Social Security benefits, deferring to the 
complex scheme of administrative and judicial remedies provided by 
the Social Security Act.34  Whether or not Congress in these cases had 
intended to displace Bivens, the decisions at least rested on the 
(however dubious) premise that Congress had indeed so provided.  
Moreover, “[t]o the extent that the logic of Bivens turned on the 
possibility that it was ‘damages or nothing,’ that concern was not as 
strongly implicated in cases where federal law did not force that 
choice.”35 
The far more significant retrenchment of Bivens, though, took 
place through the other exception Justice Brennan identified—the 
existence of “special factors counseling hesitation” before courts 
should recognize a self-executing constitutional damages remedy.36  
At first, the Court’s “special factors” jurisprudence focused on claims 
                                                 
 29. See, e.g., Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 68 (2001) (explaining the 
Court’s consistent refusal to extend Bivens liability to new contexts or new categories 
of defendants); Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 390 (1983) (declining to extend Bivens 
remedies to First Amendment violations in the context of federal employment 
because of the existence of alternative federal remedies). 
 30. Green, 446 U.S. at 19–20 (emphasis added). 
 31. 462 U.S. 367 (1983). 
 32. Id. at 385–86. 
 33. 487 U.S. 412 (1988). 
 34. Id. at 419–20. 
 35. Vladeck, supra note 11, at 264. 
 36. In Bivens itself, Justice Brennan gave only two examples:  United States v. 
Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 316 (1947), in which the U.S. government was the 
plaintiff (and therefore could have created the liability it sought to enforce), and 
Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 648 (1963), in which an employee of Congress was 
sued for allegedly exceeding his delegated authority—hardly a constitutional claim.  
See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 
396–97 (1971). 
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arising out of the military.  Thus, in Chappell v. Wallace,37 handed 
down the same day as Bush v. Lucas, the Court focused on the unique 
nature of the military’s internal system of discipline as a “special 
factor” counseling against the recognition of a Bivens claim by 
enlisted personnel against their superior officers alleging racial 
discrimination (notwithstanding the application of Bivens to equal 
protection claims in Davis v. Passman).38  Four years later, the Court 
in United States v. Stanley39 concluded that there were “special factors” 
weighing against a Bivens remedy for an action brought by a 
serviceman claiming that he was secretly subjected to LSD as part of 
an Army experiment:   
The “special facto[r]” that “counsel[s] hesitation” is . . . the fact 
that congressionally uninvited intrusion into military affairs by the 
judiciary is inappropriate . . . .  We hold that no Bivens remedy is 
available for injuries that “arise out of or are in the course of 
activity incident to service.”40 
As I have suggested before, both Chappell and Stanley “concerned 
the hyper-specific issue of civil lawsuits arising out of military service, 
an area in which the courts had a record of according substantial 
deference to the political branches that pre-dated Bivens by 
decades.”41  Thus, as with Bush and Schweiker, these early decisions 
could be seen as relatively narrow carve-outs to an otherwise vibrant 
doctrine. 
But the Court’s next two Bivens decisions sent quite the opposite 
message.  In FDIC v. Meyer,42 the Court declined to recognize a Bivens 
remedy based on a due process claim against the Federal Savings and 
Loan Insurance Corporation, holding that “special factors” generally 
counseled against Bivens remedies against federal agencies.43  As 
Justice Thomas explained, “[i]f we were to recognize a direct action 
for damages against federal agencies, we would be creating a 
potentially enormous financial burden for the Federal 
Government.”44  Similarly, in Correctional Services Corp. v. Malesko,45 
decided just two months after the September 11 attacks, the Court 
                                                 
 37. 462 U.S. 296 (1983). 
 38. Id. at 304. 
 39. 483 U.S. 669 (1987). 
 40. Id. at 683–84 (alterations in original) (quoting Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396; Feres 
v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 146 (1950)). 
 41. Vladeck, supra note 11, at 264. 
 42. 510 U.S. 471 (1994). 
 43. See id. at 485–86 (specifying that the damages remedies applied under Bivens 
would inappropriately affect federal fiscal policy if awarded against federal agencies). 
 44. Id. at 486. 
 45. 534 U.S. 61 (2001). 
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refused to extend Bivens to a suit against the private operators of a 
federal halfway house, even though the underlying claim closely 
mirrored that which the Court had approved in Green.46  Without 
specifically explaining why “special factors” counseled hesitation, 
Chief Justice Rehnquist held that Bivens relief should only be 
recognized “to provide an otherwise nonexistent cause of action 
against individual officers alleged to have acted unconstitutionally, or 
to provide a cause of action for a plaintiff who lacked any alternative 
remedy for harms caused by an individual officer’s unconstitutional 
conduct.”47 
Indeed, although it was decided shortly after September 11, 
Malesko helps drive home the state of Bivens jurisprudence at the 
outset of the war on terrorism:  The Court had shown increasing 
skepticism toward recognizing “new” Bivens claims primarily by 
relying on the idea of “special factors”; but at the same time, the 
Court had never rejected Bivens relief when such a claim was the only 
means by which the plaintiff could vindicate a constitutional claim 
against a federal officer.48  Despite the objections of Justices Scalia 
and Thomas to the entire Bivens enterprise,49 the Court had quite 
carefully left open the possibility that, in a case where the choice was 
truly between “Bivens or nothing,”50 the Justices might choose the 
former. 
B. Contractor Preemption 
Unlike Bivens, where significant pre-September 11 case law helped 
to illuminate the trend in the Supreme Court’s approach, only one 
                                                 
 46. Id. at 63. 
 47. Id. at 70. 
 48. See, e.g., Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 19–20 (1980) (permitting Bivens 
remedies for persons injured by federal officers’ Eighth Amendment violations given 
the absence of alternative remedies); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. 
Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 409–10 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in the 
judgment) (“For people in Bivens’ shoes, it is damages or nothing.”). See generally 
Carlos Manuel Vázquez & Stephen I. Vladeck, State Law and the Nature of the Bivens 
Question, 161 U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2038641. 
 49. See Malesko, 534 U.S. at 75 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“Bivens is a relic of the 
heady days in which this Court assumed common-law powers to create causes of 
action . . . .  As the Court points out, we have abandoned that power to invent 
‘implications’ in the statutory field.  There is even greater reason to abandon it in the 
constitutional field, since an ‘implication’ imagined in the Constitution can 
presumably not even be repudiated by Congress.”). For a critique of Justice Scalia’s 
analogy to the Court’s implied statutory remedy jurisprudence, see Stephen I. 
Vladeck, Bivens Remedies and the Myth of the “Heady Days,” 8 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 514 
(2012). 
 50. See Pfander & Baltmanis, supra note 18, at 123 (contending that when Bivens 
claims are denied, most plaintiffs are unable to pursue state-law theories). 
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decision by the Supreme Court prior to 2001 specifically spoke to the 
question of “contractor preemption,” i.e., cases in which the federal 
government’s interests justified judicial recognition of a federal 
common law rule barring state-law claims against government 
contractors.51  That (controversial) case was the Court’s 1988 decision 
in Boyle v. United Technologies Corp.52 
Boyle arose out of the crash of a military helicopter.53  The heirs of 
one of the decedents brought a state-law wrongful death action 
against the contractor responsible for designing the helicopter, 
alleging that a design flaw in the escape hatch prevented the 
decedent (who had survived the initial crash into the Atlantic Ocean) 
from escaping before he drowned.54 
Writing for a 5-4 Court, Justice Scalia held that such a state-law 
claim was “displaced” by federal common law.55  At the outset, he 
emphasized case law holding that “obligations to and rights of the 
United States under its contracts are governed exclusively by federal 
law,”56 as is “the civil liability of federal officials for actions taken in 
the course of their duty.”57  Although Boyle involved a government 
contractor and not a federal employee, the Court still noted that in 
both instances the government’s interest in having the work 
completed remains constant.58  Thus, Justice Scalia explained that 
imposing liability on government contractors would be adverse to the 
interests of the United States because government contractors would 
respond by either:  (1) raising procurement prices or (2) declining to 
follow design specifications.59 
                                                 
 51. To be sure, there are other contexts in which federal interests have been held 
to justify the displacement via federal common law of state-law remedies, including 
cases in which the relevant considerations sounded in foreign policy.  See, e.g., Am. 
Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 397 (2003) (holding that a California statute 
requiring disclosure of certain World War II insurance policy information was 
preempted by foreign policy considerations).  But Boyle and its progeny bespeak a 
unique form of preemption, as articulated below.  See infra notes 53–65 and 
accompanying text. 
 52. 487 U.S. 500 (1988). 
 53. Id. at 502. 
 54. See id. at 502–04 (summarizing the case’s background). 
 55. Indeed, the Court consciously appeared to distinguish in Boyle between 
“displacement” and “preemption” of state law.  The latter occurs when positive 
federal law ousts state law by virtue of the Supremacy Clause; the former occurs when 
federal common law is the culprit.  See, e.g., id. at 507–08 n.3 (noting explicitly that 
the Court is referring to the displacement of state law and not preemption); cf. Am. 
Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2534–35 (2011) (referring to the 
statutory “displacement” of federal common law). 
 56. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 504. 
 57. Id. at 505. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. at 507. 
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That federal interests were triggered, though, was not the end of 
the inquiry.  Instead, Justice Scalia then explained that such interests 
justify the displacement of state law only when “a ‘significant conflict’ 
exists between an identifiable ‘federal policy or interest and the 
[operation] of state law,’ or the application of state law would 
‘frustrate specific objectives’ of federal legislation.”60  As he 
concluded, “[t]he conflict with federal policy need not be as sharp as 
that which must exist for ordinary pre-emption when Congress 
legislates ‘in a field which the States have traditionally occupied.’ . . .  
But conflict there must be.”61 
Turning to the case at hand, Justice Scalia found the existence of 
precisely such a conflict, since the government contract imposed on 
the contractor a duty to install the escape hatch pursuant to the 
government’s specifications while the plaintiff claimed the contractor 
had a conflicting duty to deviate from those specifications by 
including other escape hatch mechanisms.62  In other words, in an 
area of such strong federal concern, state-law claims should not be 
allowed to go forward when they present such a square conflict with 
existing (and presumptively valid) federal policy choices.63  This was 
especially so, Justice Scalia reasoned, because of the FTCA, which 
specifically exempts from suit claims arising out of a government 
officer’s performance of a “discretionary function.”64  Because “[w]e 
think that the selection of the appropriate design for military 
equipment to be used by our Armed Forces is assuredly a 
discretionary function within the meaning of this provision,” it was 
that much clearer that the strong federal interest not only counseled 
against state-law claims, but against any liability whatsoever.65 
The Supreme Court has not reconsidered (or extended) Boyle since 
it was decided.  At least before September 11, however, lower courts 
had primarily understood Boyle as nothing more than an extension of 
the FTCA’s “discretionary function” exception to a particular type of 
state-law tort suits against contractors, whether because it was a 
“derivative immunity” or a form of “federal common law 
preemption.”  In 2000, for example, the Fifth Circuit cited Boyle for 
the proposition that “[g]overnment contractor immunity is derived 
from the government’s immunity from suit where the performance of 
                                                 
 60. Id. (alteration in original) (citations omitted). 
 61. Id. at 507–08 (citations omitted). 
 62. Id. at 509. 
 63. See id. at 509–10. 
 64. Id. at 500–01. 
 65. Id. at 511.  
VLADECK.OFF.TO.PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)  6/14/2012  7:11 PM 
2012] THE NEW NATIONAL SECURITY CANON 1307 
a discretionary function is at issue.”66  And in an earlier case, the 
Seventh Circuit described Boyle as holding that, “under certain 
circumstances, government contractors are shielded from state tort 
liability [only] for products manufactured for the Armed Forces of 
the United States.”67 
Indeed, pre-September 11 cases relying on Boyle invariably involved 
relatively minor variations on the underlying theme:  plaintiffs 
seeking to use state law to recover against contractors for claims that 
would have been barred under the discretionary function exception 
if brought directly against the responsible government officers.  
Virtually all of these suits arose in the products liability context.68 
C. The Political Question Doctrine 
Whereas Bivens and Boyle both go to the availability vel non of a 
cause of action arising out of governmental (or government 
contractor) misconduct, there are also a number of defenses in suits 
challenging official action,69 including the political question doctrine.  
Although it has its origins in Marbury v. Madison,70 in contemporary 
terms, the political question doctrine is shorthand for the recognition 
that there are some disputes ill-suited for judicial resolution, either 
because the Constitution commits their resolution to other branches 
or because the claims lack “judicially manageable standards.”71 
Despite the amount of attention the doctrine receives and its 
prominence in the lower courts, “[t]he political question doctrine 
has occupied a more limited place in the Supreme Court’s 
jurisprudence than is sometimes assumed,” as Judge Kavanaugh of 
                                                 
 66. Kerstetter v. Pac. Scientific Co., 210 F.3d 431, 435 (5th Cir. 2000). 
 67. Oliver v. Oshkosh Truck Corp., 96 F.3d 992, 997 (7th Cir. 1996). 
 68. Chief Justice Rehnquist explained Boyle as standing for the proposition that, 
“[w]here the government has directed a contractor to do the very thing that is the 
subject of the claim, we have recognized this as a special circumstance where the 
contractor may assert a defense.”  Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 74 n.6 
(2001). 
 69. As noted above, I do not consider the state secrets privilege in this Essay.  
Supra note 10 (noting the parameters of this Essay as well as providing helpful 
citations to more complete discussions of the state secrets privilege before and after 
September 11). 
 70. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170–71 (1803) (“Where the head of a department acts 
in a case, in which executive discretion is to be exercised; in which he is the mere 
organ of executive will; it is again repeated, that any application to a court to control, 
in any respect, his conduct, would be rejected without hesitation.”). 
 71. These are two of the six factors articulated in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 
(1962).  Over time, they have come to be seen as the two dominant considerations.  
See, e.g., El-Shifa Pharm. Indus. Co. v. United States, 607 F.3d 836, 856 (D.C. Cir. 
2010) (en banc) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in the judgment) (noting that, over the 
past fifty years, the Court has exclusively relied on these two Baker factors in applying 
the political question doctrine), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 997 (2011). 
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the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
Circuit recently explained.72  Indeed, only twice in the past half-
century has the Court relied on the existence of a “textually 
demonstrable commitment” to another branch to dismiss a case on 
political question grounds,73 and the cases involving the absence of 
“judicially manageable standards” have all fallen within the same 
subject-matter:  challenges to “partisan” gerrymandering.74 
Thus, in Nixon v. United States,75 decided in 1993, the Court threw 
out a suit by former federal judge Walter Nixon seeking to contest 
the means by which he was removed from office.76  After being 
impeached by the House of Representatives, Nixon was tried before a 
special Senate committee, which was empowered to “receive evidence 
and take testimony” before reporting back to the full body, which 
then proceeded to reach a verdict pursuant to the constitutionally 
prescribed procedure.77  Nixon claimed that the proceedings before 
the committee were inconsistent with the constitutional requirement 
that he be tried by the Senate because the full Senate was barred 
from participating in the evidentiary hearings.78  For a unanimous 
Court (although some Justices offered different rationales),79 Chief 
Justice Rehnquist held Nixon’s claims to be barred by the political 
question doctrine.80  According to Rehnquist, the text of the 
Constitution (which invests the Senate with the “sole” power to “try” 
                                                 
 72. El-Shifa, 607 F.3d at 856 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 73. See Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 228–29 (1993) (concluding that 
exclusive power to adjudicate the merits of impeachment proceedings against federal 
judges is textually committed to the Senate by virtue of Art. I, § 3, cl. 6); Gilligan v. 
Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 10 (1973) (explaining that surveillance over the weaponry, 
training, and standing orders of the National Guard are responsibilities vested 
exclusively in the executive and legislative branches). 
 74. See, e.g., League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 416 
(2006) (plurality opinion) (lamenting that drawing congressional lines is an 
unwelcome task for the judiciary because of the difficulties in drawing a “fair and 
rational” map); Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 281 (2004) (plurality opinion) 
(dismissing a gerrymandering challenge to Pennsylvania’s legislative districts due to a 
lack of judicially manageable standards). 
 75. 506 U.S. 224 (1993). 
 76. Id. at 228. 
 77. Id. at 226–28. 
 78. Id. at 228. 
 79. Justices White and Souter each wrote separate opinions concurring only in 
the judgment. See id. at 239–40 (White, J., concurring in the judgment) (reasoning 
that the Court did have jurisdiction to ensure that the Senate “tried” impeached 
officials, but that the Senate had met that standard in the instant case); id. at 252–54 
(Souter, J., concurring in the judgment) (agreeing that judicial interference in 
Senate impeachment trials would lead to impermissible consequences, but 
suggesting that review might nevertheless be available in cases of egregious 
misconduct by the Senate). 
 80. Id. at 237–38 (majority opinion). 
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cases of impeachment)81 categorically precluded judicial second-
guessing of the means by which such a trial was conducted.82 
As for cases raising a lack of judicially manageable standards, a 
good (albeit post-September 11) example is the Court’s 2004 
decision in Vieth v. Jubelirer.83  There, voters challenged the 
constitutionality of Pennsylvania’s redistricting plan following the 
2000 census, arguing that, because of the Pennsylvania legislature’s 
partisan gerrymandering, the new district maps violated the “one 
person, one vote” rule84 of Reynolds v. Sims.85  In 1986, the Supreme 
Court had concluded in Davis v. Bandemer86 that the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment empowered federal judges to 
circumscribe partisan gerrymandering.87  Writing for a four-Justice 
plurality in Vieth, however, Justice Scalia emphasized the extent to 
which no remotely manageable standard had emerged in the 
eighteen intervening years that could draw the line between “good 
politics and bad politics.”88  Put more bluntly, no one had been able 
to articulate a sufficiently clear set of standards to explain whether—
and to what extent—district lines drawn for one political party’s 
partisan advantage would violate Article I, Article IV, or the Equal 
Protection Clause. 
The political significance of the decision aside, the critical point 
about Vieth for present purposes is the extent to which that prong of 
the political question doctrine has only surfaced in contemporary 
disputes along similar lines.  In ascertaining the scope of the political 
question doctrine in national security cases after September 11, it is 
the first of the Baker v. Carr89 factors, and not the second, that will 
prove critical. 
D. Qualified Immunity 
Finally, perhaps the most commonly invoked defense in suits 
challenging official action is officer immunity.  Although some 
                                                 
 81. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6 (“The Senate shall have the sole Power to try 
all Impeachments.  When sitting for that Purpose, they shall be on Oath or 
Affirmation.  When the President of the United States is tried, the Chief Justice shall 
preside:  And no Person shall be convicted without the Concurrence of two thirds of 
the Members present.”). 
 82. See Nixon, 506 U.S. at 234–35. 
 83. 541 U.S. 267 (2004). 
 84. See id. at 290 (rejecting plaintiffs’ argument that the “one person, one vote” 
rule provided judicially manageable standards with which to resolve the dispute). 
 85. 377 U.S. 533 (1964). 
 86. 478 U.S. 109 (1986). 
 87. Id. at 143. 
 88. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 299 (plurality opinion). 
 89. 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
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officers are entitled to “absolute immunity” when acting in particular 
capacities,90 the doctrine of far more relevance here is “qualified 
immunity,” which provides that “government officials performing 
discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil 
damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established 
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would 
have known.”91  In enunciating the current standard in Harlow v. 
Fitzgerald92 in 1982, the Court famously disclaimed reliance upon 
subjective considerations (such as malice or bad faith), opting instead 
for an objective inquiry that could be resolved in most cases on the 
pleadings, or at worst, at summary judgment.93 
The qualified immunity test itself has undergone only modest 
revisions since Harlow.  In Anderson v. Creighton,94 for example, the 
Court clarified that:   
The contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a 
reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates 
that right.  This is not to say that an official action is protected by 
qualified immunity unless the very action in question has previously 
been held unlawful, but it is to say that in the light of pre-existing 
law the unlawfulness must be apparent.95 
Thus, most of the doctrinal innovation with regard to qualified 
immunity has centered not on whether the right of the plaintiff in 
question was “clearly established,” but whether the unlawfulness of 
the officer’s conduct was “apparent.”96  A subtle distinction in theory, it 
has proved rather significant in practice.97 
Separate from the standard to apply in qualified immunity cases is 
the means by which qualified immunity claims are resolved.  
                                                 
 90. See, e.g., Rehberg v. Paulk, 132 S. Ct. 1497, 1501–05 (2012) (summarizing the 
origins and scope of absolute immunity to § 1983 suits). 
 91. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). 
 92. 457 U.S. 800 (1982). 
 93. Thus, qualified immunity “is an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense 
to liability; and like an absolute immunity, it is effectively lost if a case is erroneously 
permitted to go to trial.”  Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985).  To that end, 
the denial of a qualified immunity defense is subject to immediate interlocutory 
appeal under the collateral order doctrine.  Id. at 524–30. 
 94. 483 U.S. 635 (1987). 
 95. Id. at 640. 
 96. See, e.g., Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002) (“This is not to say that an 
official action is protected by qualified immunity unless the very action in question 
has previously been held unlawful; but it is to say that in the light of pre-existing law 
the unlawfulness must be apparent.” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
 97. See, e.g., Henry v. Purnell, 652 F.3d 524, 534–35 (4th Cir.) (en banc) 
(rejecting officer’s argument that he was entitled to qualified immunity because it 
was not clearly established that shooting a fleeing nonthreatening misdemeanant 
would be unlawful under the circumstances), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 781 (2011). 
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Typically, a qualified immunity defense presents two analytically 
distinct questions:  (1) whether the officer’s conduct was unlawful 
(the “legality” question); and (2) whether the unlawfulness should 
have been apparent in light of clearly established law (the “liability” 
question).  Although an officer cannot be liable unless his conduct 
was also unlawful, the same is not true in reverse.  As such, courts 
might be tempted to assume, without deciding, that the conduct was 
unlawful in cases in which the law was not yet clearly established, 
since the defendant prevails regardless of the legality of his conduct.98 
Such an approach, however, would potentially thwart the 
development of forward-looking law, since courts would not be 
“establishing” any legal rules going forward.99 
To ward against that possibility, the Supreme Court in June 2001 
mandated a particular “order-of-battle” in qualified immunity cases, 
holding in Saucier v. Katz100 that lower courts should answer the 
legality question first in all cases, including those in which the 
defendant will nevertheless prevail on liability.101  As Justice Kennedy 
explained for the majority:   
This is the process for the law’s elaboration from case to case . . . .  
The law might be deprived of this explanation were a court simply 
to skip ahead to the question whether the law clearly established 
that the officer’s conduct was unlawful in the circumstances of the 
case.102 
Thus, qualified immunity on the eve of September 11 had two 
salient characteristics.  First, under Anderson, the central question was 
whether the unlawfulness of the defendant’s conduct (and not the 
plaintiff’s underlying right) was apparent in light of “clearly 
established” law.  Second, under the so-called “Saucier sequence,” 
even in cases in which that standard could not be met, courts still had 
a duty to answer the legality question—and to thereby articulate 
forward-looking principles of constitutional law to govern future 
cases, even if they were ultimately irrelevant to the disposition of the 
case sub judice. 
                                                 
 98. See, e.g., County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 841 n.5 (1998) 
(recounting that the District Court granted summary judgment on a qualified 
immunity theory by assuming, without deciding, that a substantive due process 
violation had taken place, but then holding that the law was not established with 
sufficient clarity to justify § 1983 liability). 
 99. See id. (stating that an immunity determination alone would not create any 
standards for future cases). 
 100. 533 U.S. 194 (2001). 
 101. Id. at 206. 
 102. Id. at 201. 
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II. THE FEDERAL COURTS CANON AFTER SEPTEMBER 11, 2001 
It seems silly to ask whether the terrorist attacks of September 11 
and the government’s various responses thereto have had an impact 
on the federal courts.  Quite obviously, much has changed over the 
past eleven years.103  But there is a critical difference in this context 
between correlation and causation.  Thus, in this Part, I revisit the 
four doctrinal areas surveyed in Part I, and examine some of the 
critical developments in each since September 11.  As this Part will 
demonstrate, some of the innovations of the past decade seem to 
have very little to do with national security concerns, whereas others 
are entirely a creature of such concerns. 
A. Bivens Remedies 
The Supreme Court has handed down two significant Bivens 
decisions since September 11.104  In the first, Wilkie v. Robbins,105 the 
Court rejected a Bivens claim arising out of a series of run-ins between 
a ranch owner and U.S. Bureau of Land Management officials over 
an easement, which led to charges of harassment and retaliation.106  
The Court’s analysis identified “a special factor counseling hesitation 
quite unlike any we have recognized before.”107  The Court harped on 
the “difficulty” that would result from finding a new Bivens remedy to 
redress Robbins’s individual and distinct injuries collectively, because 
“a general provision for tort-like liability when Government 
employees are unduly zealous in pressing a governmental interest 
affecting property would invite an onslaught of Bivens actions.”108  
Although the special factor identified in Wilkie was new, the Court 
again seized on the likelihood that each of Robbins’s individual 
claims likely had an adequate remedy under federal or state law.109 
                                                 
 103. Indeed, this Essay has all but ignored the remarkable body of habeas corpus 
jurisprudence precipitated by the detention of terrorism suspects since 2001.  See 
generally Stephen I. Vladeck, The New Habeas Revisionism, 124 HARV. L. REV. 941 (2011) 
(book review) (surveying the impact of historical understandings of the Suspension 
Clause on contemporary litigation).  
 104. Bivens has also been at issue in two additional cases.  In Hartman v. Moore, 547 
U.S. 250 (2006), the Court addressed the elements a plaintiff must plead in order to 
make out a retaliatory prosecution Bivens claim without addressing the availability of 
a Bivens remedy in any more detail.  Id. at 251.  And in Hui v. Castaneda, 130 S. Ct. 
1845 (2010), the Court held that the Public Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C. § 233(a), 
provides a statutory alternative to Bivens claims against Public Health Service 
employees arising out of their official duties.  130 S. Ct. at 1853.  Neither decision 
broke new ground in Bivens jurisprudence. 
 105. 551 U.S. 537 (2007). 
 106. Id. at 561–62. 
 107. Id. at 577 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 108. Id. at 562 (majority opinion). 
 109. See id. (asserting that legislation would be better suited to remedy 
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Finally, just this Term, the Court in Minneci v. Pollard110 appeared to 
come full-circle on Bivens, rejecting a claim against an individual 
employee working for a private contractor operating a federal prison 
on the ground that adequate remedies were almost certainly available 
under state law.111  Although the claim closely mirrored that which 
the Court had approved in Green, the Court held that “Pollard’s 
Eighth Amendment claim focuses upon a kind of conduct that 
typically falls within the scope of traditional state tort law.  And in the 
case of a privately employed defendant, state tort law provides an 
‘alternative, existing process’ capable of protecting the constitutional 
interests at stake.”112 
In both Wilkie and Pollard, then, the Court continued the trend of 
declining to recognize “new” Bivens claims, albeit on fairly narrow 
terms in each instance.  Wilkie recognized a “new” “special factor” in 
the form of the potential floodgates of recognizing a zealousness-
based property-rights Bivens claim;113 Pollard suggested that adequate 
state-law remedies may by themselves be sufficient to displace 
Bivens,114 at least where the defendant is a private contractor 
operating under color of state law, rather than a government officer. 
In contrast to the Supreme Court’s cautious skepticism, three 
different circuit courts have recognized a new obstacle to Bivens 
claims in national security cases—a “special factor” based on the 
sensitivity of the government’s national security policies.  Properly 
understood, such a “special factor” both (1) unduly incorporates 
other doctrinal concerns into cause-of-action analysis and (2) would 
therefore bar any and all recovery to the relevant plaintiffs, going a 
critical step beyond anything the Supreme Court has ever sanctioned. 
The first decision to reach this result was the D.C. Circuit’s holding 
in Rasul v. Myers115 (Rasul II).  Rasul II was a damages suit brought by 
non-citizens formerly detained as “enemy combatants” at 
Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, alleging a series of violations of their 
statutory, constitutional, and treaty-based rights in their detention 
                                                 
government overreach than judicially created factors). 
 110. 132 S. Ct. 617 (2012). 
 111. See id. at 623–24 (stating that state tort law can be effective in preventing 
constitutional violations). 
 112. Id. at 623.  As Carlos Vázquez and I argue in a forthcoming article, Pollard 
may thereby refocus Bivens analysis on the relationship between federal and state 
remedies—as opposed to the recognition of one to the exclusion of the other.  See 
Vázquez & Vladeck, supra note 48.  
 113. See Wilkie, 551 U.S. at 561 (contemplating the danger of a “‘too much’ 
standard”). 
 114. See Pollard, 132 S. Ct. at 621. 
 115. 563 F.3d 527 (D.C. Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1013 (2009). 
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and treatment while in custody.116 Initially, the D.C. Circuit rejected 
the plaintiffs’ claims on qualified immunity grounds, holding that 
because the detainees had no legally cognizable rights, it necessarily 
followed that the defendants’ alleged misconduct could not have 
been unlawful.117  After the Supreme Court held in Boumediene v. 
Bush118 that the Constitution’s Suspension Clause “has full effect” at 
Guantánamo,119 the Court “GVR’d”120 Rasul for reconsideration in 
light of that holding.121  On remand, the Court of Appeals reaffirmed 
its qualified immunity holding,122 but added a footnote identifying an 
alternative, equally fatal bar to recovery—one borrowed from Judge 
Janice Rogers Brown’s concurrence in the original panel opinion123:  
“federal courts cannot fashion a Bivens action when ‘special factors’ 
counsel against doing so.  The danger of obstructing U.S. national 
security policy is one such factor.”124  Perhaps because of that cryptic 
footnote, the Supreme Court denied certiorari the second time 
around.125 
Just over six months after the D.C. Circuit’s decision in Rasul II, the 
en banc Second Circuit reached a similarly themed result in Arar v. 
                                                 
 116. See id. at 528.  The lead plaintiff in Rasul II was also the lead plaintiff in Rasul 
v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004) (holding that the federal courts have statutory 
jurisdiction over habeas petitions brought by non-citizens detained at Guantánamo). 
 117. See Rasul v. Myers, 512 F.3d 644 (D.C. Cir.), vacated, 555 U.S. 1083 (2008).  
For a more general overview of the D.C. Circuit’s jurisprudence vis-à-vis 
Guantánamo—and where Rasul fits in, see Stephen I. Vladeck, The D.C. Circuit After 
Boumediene, 41 SETON HALL L. REV. 1451 (2011). 
 118. 553 U.S. 723 (2008). 
 119. Id. at 771. 
 120. A “GVR” order is a summary order from the Supreme Court granting 
certiorari, vacating the decision below, and remanding for reconsideration in light of 
an intervening development—usually a new decision by the Court on a related issue.  
See generally Lawrence v. Chater, 516 U.S. 163, 165–66 (1996) (describing GVRs and 
deciding that issuing such orders is within the Court’s discretionary certiorari 
jurisdiction). 
 121. See 555 U.S. 1083, 1083 (2008). 
 122. See Rasul II, 563 F.3d 527, 529–30 (D.C. Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 130 S. 
Ct. 1013 (2009). 
 123. Rasul v. Myers, 512 F.3d 644, 672–73 (D.C. Cir.) (Brown, J., concurring), 
vacated, 555 U.S. 1083 (2008). 
 124. Rasul II, 563 F.3d at 532 n.5.  Specifically, the footnote relied on the D.C. 
Circuit’s 1985 decision in Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202 (D.C. Cir. 1985).  
There, then-Judge Scalia had declined to recognize a Bivens claim arising out of the 
Iran-Contra affair, arguing that “the special needs of foreign affairs must stay our 
hand in the creation of damage remedies against military and foreign policy officials 
for allegedly unconstitutional treatment of foreign subjects causing injury abroad.”  
Id. at 209.  Even Sanchez-Espinoza, though, turned on the fact that the allegedly 
unconstitutional conduct took place on foreign soil, and not, as in Rasul, on the 
grounds of a U.S. military base over which no other country was sovereign.  Id. at 
206–07. 
 125. Rasul v. Myers, 130 S. Ct. 1013, 1013 (2009). 
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Ashcroft.126  Arar, a dual Canadian-Syrian citizen, was arrested by U.S. 
authorities at JFK International Airport in September 2002 because 
he was (apparently wrongfully) suspected of involvement with al 
Qaeda.127  Arar was subsequently detained (and allegedly abused) for 
thirteen days before he was subjected to “extraordinary rendition” to 
Syria, where he remained in custody for just under one year.128  Arar 
subsequently brought a damages suit against the U.S. officers 
responsible for his initial detention, his treatment while in U.S. 
custody, and his subsequent transfer to Syria.129 
In affirming the district court’s dismissal of Arar’s suit, the en banc 
Second Circuit held that his Bivens claims were unavailing because a 
special factor counseled hesitation—to wit, “rendition.”130  As Chief 
Judge Jacobs wrote for a 7-4 en banc majority, “in the context of 
extraordinary rendition, [a Bivens] action would have the natural 
tendency to affect diplomacy, foreign policy, and the security of the 
nation, and that fact counsels hesitation.”131  Noting that 
“‘[h]esitation’ is ‘counseled’ whenever thoughtful discretion would 
pause even to consider,”132 the Court of Appeals concluded that 
damages suits seeking remedies against officials who were 
implementing extraordinary rendition policies would impermissibly 
entrench the courts in deciding the validity of these important 
national security policy questions.133  Suggesting in addition that the 
classified nature of much of the evidence was also a reason to 
hesitate,134 the Court of Appeals declined to recognize a Bivens 
claim.135 
Unlike Rasul II, the Arar decision provoked a series of dissents.  
Judge Sack, in particular, wrote to emphasize the extent to which 
“heeding ‘special factors’ relating to secrecy and security is a form of 
double counting inasmuch as those interests are fully protected by 
the state-secrets privilege.”136  Judge Calabresi agreed, noting that the 
court already had appropriate methods for protecting secrets.137  
                                                 
 126. 585 F.3d 559 (2d Cir. 2009) (en banc), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 3409 (2010). 
 127. Id. at 563. 
 128. Id. at 565–66. 
 129. See id. at 567 (detailing the complaint that Arar filed against federal officials 
for harms resulting from his detention and removal to Syria). 
 130. Id. at 563. 
 131. Id. at 574. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. at 575. 
 134. Id. at 576. 
 135. Id. at 580. 
 136. Id. at 583 (Sack, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 137. See id. at 635 (Calabresi, J., dissenting) (agreeing with Judge Sack’s 
observation that the denial of a Bivens remedy on national security grounds is 
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Thus, he suggested that rejecting Bivens suits merely “because state 
secrets might be revealed is a bit like denying a criminal trial for fear 
that a juror might be intimidated:  it allows a risk, that the law is 
already at great pains to eliminate, to negate entirely substantial 
rights and procedures.”138  Notwithstanding the force of the double-
counting concern, or the more general point that incorporating case-
specific concerns about defenses into analysis of the general 
availability of a cause of action dangerously conflates longstanding 
bodies of precedent,139 the Supreme Court denied certiorari, with no 
dissents.140 
Whereas Rasul II and Arar both involved non-citizen plaintiffs 
whose constitutional rights were unclear, at best, the third case in the 
trilogy is quite the opposite.  In Lebron v. Rumsfeld,141 the Fourth 
Circuit upheld the dismissal of a Bivens suit on behalf of Jose Padilla, 
a U.S. citizen challenging the legality of his long-term extracriminal 
detention within the United States as an “enemy combatant” and his 
treatment therein.142  Writing for a unanimous panel, Judge 
Wilkinson emphasized the “special factors” that, in the court’s view, 
counseled hesitation:   
First, the Constitution delegates authority over military affairs to 
Congress and to the President as Commander in Chief.  It 
contemplates no comparable role for the judiciary.  Second, 
judicial review of military decisions would stray from the traditional 
subjects of judicial competence.  Litigation of the sort proposed 
thus risks impingement on explicit constitutional assignments of 
responsibility to the coordinate branches of our government.143 
In so holding, Judge Wilkinson provided perhaps the most detailed 
analytical underpinnings to the reasoning first deployed in Rasul II 
and Arar:  the amorphous special factor identified in the two earlier 
cases is, in fact, a series of considerations generally reflecting the 
constitutional and practical difficulties courts face whenever they are 
                                                 
“double counting of the government’s interest in preserving state secrets”). 
 138. Id. at 635 (footnote omitted); see also id. at 637 (“These, then, are the 
majority’s determinative ‘special factors’:  a mix of risks that are amply addressed by 
the state secrets doctrine and policy concerns that inhere in all Bivens actions and in 
innumerable every-day tort actions as well.”). 
 139. See, e.g., Vladeck, supra note 11, at 275–77 (discussing use of various 
government defenses to articulate a special factor counseling hesitation). 
 140. 130 S. Ct. 3409 (2010).  Presumably, because she was on the Second Circuit 
throughout most of the en banc proceedings, Justice Sotomayor did not participate.  
See id. (noting that Justice Sotomayor did not take part in considering the petition for 
certiorari). 
 141. 670 F.3d 540 (4th Cir. 2012). 
 142. Id. at 548. 
 143. Id. 
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asked to review “military affairs,” including the alleged abuse of 
citizens by the military within the territorial United States.144  If this is 
a “special factor” counseling hesitation against inferring a Bivens 
remedy, one is hard-pressed to imagine any challenge to the conduct 
of national security policy, whether here or overseas, that could 
survive such a test. 
Moreover, to whatever extent the courts have identified other 
novel special factors in cases less-directly implicating national security 
and foreign affairs over the past decade, one can immediately identify 
two material differences.  First, in the national security context, the 
“special factors” analysis seizes on the general inappropriateness of 
any judicial interference with governmental action in the relevant 
arena.145  Second, and related, the Bivens decisions in the national 
security cases are therefore unlike Wilkie, Pollard, and other lower-
court holdings; in Rasul II, Arar, and Lebron, it really was “Bivens or 
nothing.”146  Each time, the Court of Appeals chose the latter.147 
B. Contractor Preemption 
Whereas the cases discussed above go to the difficulty in identifying 
a cause of action against federal officers for post-September 11 civil 
liberties abuses, the same difficulty presumably should not have 
hampered attempts to hold government contractors liable in cases in 
which they allegedly violated plaintiffs’ rights while acting under 
color of federal law.  Indeed, as Pollard held in rejecting a Bivens 
claim, it is the more normal course to use state—rather than 
                                                 
 144. Id. at 548–50. 
 145. See, e.g., id. at 549 (“Further supporting judicial deference is the 
Constitution’s parallel commitment of command responsibility in national security 
and military affairs to the President as Commander in Chief.”).  
 146. See id. at 552–55 (refusing to consider a Bivens claim where interests of other 
branches of government would be adversely affected); Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559, 
580–81 (2d Cir. 2009) (en banc) (rejecting a Bivens claim where the court 
determined that the merits of the counterterrorism policy at issue should be left to 
Congress), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 3409 (2010); Rasul II, 563 F.3d 527, 532 n.5 (D.C. 
Cir.) (per curiam) (denying a Bivens claim because no liability should be available), 
cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1013 (2009). 
 147. The one exception to this pattern thus far was the Seventh Circuit’s decision 
in Vance v. Rumsfeld, 653 F.3d 591 (7th Cir. 2011), reh’g en banc granted, Nos. 10-1687, 
10-2442, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 22083 (7th Cir. Oct. 28, 2011), in which the Court of 
Appeals held that a Bivens remedy was available—and that qualified immunity did 
not bar—a claim by U.S. citizens arising out of their allegedly unlawful detention and 
mistreatment by U.S. agents while they were working for a private Iraqi security firm.  
Id. at 594.  The Seventh Circuit has since granted the government’s petition for 
rehearing en banc, and heard argument on February 8, 2012.  SEVENTH CIRCUIT 
COURT OF APPEALS, http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/fdocs/docs.fwx?caseno=10-
1687&submit=showdkt&yr=10&num=1687 (last visited May 3, 2012). 
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federal—law to measure the liability of private contractors.148 
Nevertheless, when victims of torture at Abu Ghraib brought a civil 
suit against the defense contractors allegedly responsible for at least 
some of the abuse, a divided panel of the D.C. Circuit held in Saleh v. 
Titan Corp.149 that the plaintiffs’ state-law claims were barred under a 
Boyle-like theory, even though the lawsuit did not implicate a 
“discretionary function.”150  Invoking, instead, the distinct “combatant 
activities” exception to the FTCA,151 Judge Silberman, writing for the 
panel majority, explained that “the [Boyle] court looked to the FTCA 
exceptions to the waiver of sovereign immunity [more generally] to 
determine that the conflict was significant and to measure the 
boundaries of the conflict.”152 
Thus, the Court of Appeals could look to the combatant activities 
exception to identify the requisite “conflict” between state tort suits 
and federal policy.153  Relying on a Ninth Circuit decision that held 
that “the combatant activities exception was designed ‘to recognize 
that during wartime encounters[,] no duty of reasonable care is owed 
to those against whom force is directed as a result of authorized 
military action,’”154 the D.C. Circuit held that the same should be true 
for private military contractors.155  “[I]t is the imposition per se of the 
state or foreign tort law that conflicts with the FTCA’s policy of 
eliminating tort concepts from the battlefield,”156 Judge Silberman 
explained.  Thus, the D.C. Circuit articulated the principle of 
“battlefield preemption,” i.e., that “the federal government occupies 
the field when it comes to warfare, and its interest in combat is always 
‘precisely contrary’ to the imposition of a non-federal tort duty.”157 
Judge Garland sharply dissented, identifying two central flaws in 
the majority’s analysis.  First, as he explained:   
Boyle has never been applied to protect a contractor from liability 
resulting from the contractor’s violation of federal law and policy.  
And there is no dispute that the conduct alleged, if true, violated 
both.  Hence, these cases are not “within the area where the policy 
                                                 
 148. Minneci v. Pollard, 132 S. Ct. 617 (2012). 
 149. 580 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 3055 (2011). 
 150. Id. at 6. 
 151. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(j) (2006) (exempting from liability “[a]ny claim arising 
out of the combatant activities of the military or naval forces, or the Coast Guard, 
during time of war”). 
 152. Saleh, 580 F.3d at 6. 
 153. Id. at 6 & n.3. 
 154. See id. at 7 (alteration in original) (quoting Koohi v. United States, 976 F.2d 
1328, 1337 (9th Cir. 1992)). 
 155. Id. at 7–8. 
 156. Id. at 7. 
 157. Id. (citing Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 500 (1988)). 
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of the ‘discretionary function’ would be frustrated,” and they 
present no “significant conflict” with federal interests.  Preemption 
is therefore not justified under Boyle.158 
Second, and as significantly, Boyle’s analysis centered both textually 
and analytically on the FTCA’s discretionary function exception—
and not on the general idea that preemption could be derived from 
any or all of the FTCA’s statutory exceptions.159  Otherwise, as Judge 
Garland suggested, “there is no reason to stop there.  The FTCA’s 
exceptions are not limited to discretionary functions and combatant 
activities . . . .  Once we depart from the limiting principle of Boyle, it 
is hard to tell where to draw the line.”160  Nevertheless, despite the 
unusual (and strident) dissent from Judge Garland, along with a 
surprisingly equivocal amicus brief from the U.S. government 
respecting certiorari,161 the Supreme Court denied certiorari in 
Saleh.162 
Perhaps emboldened by the denial of certiorari in Saleh, the Fourth 
Circuit subsequently relied heavily on the D.C. Circuit’s analysis in 
throwing out another pair of state-law tort suits also arising out of 
Abu Ghraib.  Thus, after holding in Al-Quraishi v. L-3 Services, Inc.163 
that rejection of a Boyle-like defense was subject to an immediate 
interlocutory appeal under the collateral order doctrine,164 a divided 
panel of the Court of Appeals followed Saleh in Al Shimari v. CACI 
International, Inc.165  After extensively recounting the D.C. Circuit’s 
analysis, Judge Niemeyer held that “[t]he uniquely federal interest in 
conducting and controlling the conduct of war, including 
intelligence-gathering activities within military prisons, thus is simply 
incompatible with state tort liability in that context.”166  As if the point 
were not sufficiently clear, Judge Niemeyer concluded with the 
                                                 
 158. Id. at 23 (Garland, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted) (citations omitted). 
 159. See id.  One might also object that the FTCA exception is not for all military 
activities, but rather for “combatant” activities.  So construed, it may not even be 
clear that, had the same claims been brought under the FTCA against U.S. 
servicemembers, the exception would have barred relief. 
 160. Id. 
 161. In a brief invited by the Supreme Court, the Obama Administration took 
fairly substantial issue with much of the D.C. Circuit’s analysis, but nevertheless 
recommended that certiorari be denied given the narrowness of the claims and the 
lack of a circuit split.  See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Saleh v. Titan 
Corp., 131 S. Ct. 3055 (2011) (No. 09-1313), 2011 WL 2134985, at *11–13. 
 162. 131 S. Ct. at 3055. 
 163. 657 F.3d 201 (4th Cir. 2011), vacated sub nom. Al Shimari v. CACI Int’l, Inc., 
No. 10-1891, 2012 WL 1656773 (4th Cir. May 11, 2012) (en banc). 
 164. Id. at 205. 
 165. 658 F.3d 413 (4th Cir. 2011), vacated, No. 10-1891, 2012 WL 1656773 (4th 
Cir. May 11, 2012) (en banc). 
 166. Id. at 419–20. 
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observation that “[w]hat we hold is that conduct carried out during 
war and the effects of that conduct are, for the most part, not 
properly the subject of judicial evaluation,”167 and then penned a 
separate concurrence suggesting that, even if Saleh was wrongly 
decided, the political question doctrine would bar recovery.168 
Judge King, who dissented from the recognition of interlocutory 
appellate jurisdiction in Al-Quraishi, dissented on the merits in Al 
Shimari, largely reprising Judge Garland’s dissent from Saleh.169  The 
plaintiffs then sought rehearing en banc, this time with the support 
of the Obama Administration.170  And on May 11, 2012, the en banc 
Fourth Circuit held by an 11–3 vote that the Court of Appeals in fact 
lacked interlocutory appellate jurisdiction over the two district court 
decisions denying the contractors’ motions to dismiss, remanding to 
allow the district court to proceed to discovery and summary 
judgment on the merits.171  At the same time, the Court of Appeals 
expressed no view on the merits (including the Boyle preemption 
question)172—and several of the judges in the majority hinted in 
concurring opinions that they were sympathetic to the contractors’ 
defenses.173 
What is telling about both Saleh and the (now vacated) panel 
decision in Al Shimari is how dramatically they differ from other 
applications of Boyle in the circuit courts, even after September 11.  
As with the pre-September 11 jurisprudence surveyed above, other 
post-September 11 cases have stuck to the “narrow” understanding of 
Boyle—as only applying in cases implicating the “discretionary 
function” exception at most, and even then, only comfortably in cases 
arising out of products liability.174  Thus, whereas the Bivens 
jurisprudence reveals the recognition of a new kind of “special factor” 
against a backdrop in which more and more special factors have been 
                                                 
 167. Id. at 420. 
 168. See id. at 420–25 (Niemeyer, J., concurring separately). 
 169. Id. at 427–36 (King, J., dissenting). 
 170. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Al Shimari v. CACI Int’l, 
Inc., Nos. 09-1335, 10-1891, 10-1921 (4th Cir. May 11, 2012) (en banc), 2012 WL 
123570. 
 171. Al Shimari v. CACI Int’l, Inc., No. 10-1891, 2012 WL 1656773, at *13 (4th Cir. 
May 11, 2012) (en banc). 
 172. See, e.g., id. at *10 n.14. 
 173. See id. at *13 (Duncan, J., concurring).  But see id. at *14 (Wynn, J., 
concurring) (emphasizing that the jurisdictional dismissal intimated no opinion 
whatsoever on the merits). 
 174. See, e.g., In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 620 F.3d 455, 460–61 (5th Cir. 
2010) (looking only at whether Boyle’s three conditions are met in the product 
liability context). 
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identified,175 the Boyle jurisprudence reflects a categorical and 
fundamental expansion of a previously circumscribed doctrinal rule, 
grounded in, but hardly confined to, amorphous national security 
considerations. 
C. The Political Question Doctrine 
As Judge Niemeyer’s concurrence in the original panel decision in 
Al Shimari suggested,176 the political question doctrine has also 
become an increasingly prominent defense in post-September 11 
national security cases.  And yet, because the political question 
doctrine has always fared better in the lower courts than in the 
Supreme Court,177 it is more difficult to ascertain whether, in this 
context, the uptick in political question cases can be ascribed to 
unique national security considerations, or rather as part of a more 
general pattern. 
Consider in this regard the litigation in El-Shifa Pharmaceutical 
Industries Co. v. United States.178  After the U.S. government destroyed a 
Sudanese pharmaceutical plant in 1998, the government claimed in 
various statements that it had neutralized a potential chemical 
weapons facility.179  The owner of the plant, who maintained his 
innocence, brought two separate suits:  a takings claim arising out of 
the destruction of his property, and an FTCA claim premised on the 
allegedly defamatory nature of the government’s public statements.180  
In 2004, the Federal Circuit dismissed the takings claim, relying on 
the political question doctrine.181  Because the “enemy property” 
doctrine would bar recovery if the plant was in fact a chemical 
weapons factory,182 the Court of Appeals reasoned that “the 
                                                 
 175. See supra Part II.A (exploring the Court’s skepticism toward new Bivens 
remedies as demonstrated by its recognition of new “special factors”). 
 176. See Al Shimari, 658 F.3d at 420–25 (Niemeyer, J., concurring separately) 
(applying the Baker factors to the conduct of military contractors in Iraq). 
 177. Compare Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 744 (rejecting the government’s 
argument that questions of sovereignty are subject to the political question 
doctrine), with El-Shifa Pharm. Indus. Co. v. United States, 607 F.3d 836, 842–43 
(D.C. Cir. 2010) (en banc) (dismissing suit on political question doctrine grounds 
because “[a] plaintiff may not . . . clear the political question bar simply by ‘recasting 
foreign policy and national security questions in tort terms’” (quoting Schneider v. 
Kissinger, 412 F.3d 190, 197 (D.C. Cir. 2005))), cert denied, 131 S. Ct. 997 (2011), and 
Schroder v. Bush, 263 F.3d 1169, 1173 (10th Cir. 2001) (affirming application of 
political question doctrine to dismiss farmers’ suit requesting that the government 
maintain certain favorable market conditions). 
 178. 607 F.3d 836 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (en banc), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 997 (2011). 
 179. Id. at 838. 
 180. Id. at 839–40. 
 181. Id. at 839. 
 182. El-Shifa Pharm. Indus. Co. v. United States, 378 F.3d 1346, 1355–56 (Fed. Cir. 
2004); see also Stephen I. Vladeck, Enemy Aliens, Enemy Property, and Access to the Courts, 
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Constitution, in its text and by its structure, commits to the President 
the power to make extraterritorial enemy property designations such 
as the one made regarding the appellants’ Plant.”183  In other words, 
the Constitution committed to the President the unreviewable right 
to be wrong in targeting overseas enemy property.  The Supreme 
Court denied certiorari.184 
As for the defamation claim, the en banc D.C. Circuit took a 
somewhat more nuanced approach in 2010, but nevertheless rejected 
it under the political question doctrine.185  As Judge Griffith 
explained in writing for the en banc majority, “[t]he political 
question doctrine bars our review of claims that, regardless of how 
they are styled, call into question the prudence of the political 
branches in matters of foreign policy or national security 
constitutionally committed to their discretion.”186  Thus,  
[t]he case at hand involves the decision to launch a military strike 
abroad . . . .  The law-of-nations claim asks the court to decide 
whether the United States’ attack on the plant was “mistaken and 
not justified.”  The defamation claim similarly requires us to 
determine the factual validity of the government’s stated reasons 
for the strike.  If the political question doctrine means anything in 
the arena of national security and foreign relations, it means the 
courts cannot assess the merits of the President’s decision to 
launch an attack on a foreign target, and the plaintiffs ask us to do 
just that.187 
Like the Federal Circuit, then, the D.C. Circuit concluded that the 
Constitution contains a textually demonstrable commitment of such 
decision-making power to the political branches.  And as in the 
Federal Circuit case, the Supreme Court denied certiorari.188 
But whether such analysis is convincing in the context of U.S. 
military operations overseas, lower courts have also relied on the 
political question doctrine to bar claims against contractors.  For 
example, the same day as the panel decided Al-Quraishi and Al 
Shimari, the Fourth Circuit relied on the political question doctrine to 
throw out a U.S. servicemember’s claim that he was injured due to 
the negligence of a government contractor.189  Writing for a 
                                                 
11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 933 (2007) (providing background on the “enemy 
property” doctrine and its application in El-Shifa). 
 183. El-Shifa, 378 F.3d at 1367. 
 184. 545 U.S. 1139, 1139 (2005). 
 185. See El-Shifa, 607 F.3d at 838. 
 186. Id. at 842. 
 187. Id. at 844. 
 188. 131 S. Ct. 997 (2011). 
 189. Taylor v. Kellogg Brown & Root Servs., Inc., 658 F.3d 402, 403 (4th Cir. 
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unanimous panel (at least as to the judgment) in Taylor v. Kellogg 
Brown & Root Services, Inc.,190 Judge King held that such a claim could 
not go forward because “an analysis of [the defendant’s] contributory 
negligence defense would ‘invariably require the Court to decide 
whether . . . the Marines made a reasonable decision’ in seeking to 
install the wiring box to add another electric generator at the Tank 
Ramp”—without which the plaintiff would not have been injured by 
the contractor.191  That is to say, the political question doctrine barred 
adjudication of claims against contractors, at least where the 
contractor was operating under the military’s control192 and where 
“national defense interests were closely intertwined with the military’s 
decisions governing [the contractor’s] conduct.”193 
In so holding, the Fourth Circuit relied heavily on an earlier 
decision by the Eleventh Circuit rejecting an analogous claim against 
a government contractor by the wife of a servicemember who was 
seriously injured in an accident in Iraq caused by an employee.194  As 
the Court of Appeals explained in Carmichael v. Kellogg, Brown & Root 
Services, Inc.195:   
Because the circumstances under which the accident took place 
were so thoroughly pervaded by military judgments and decisions, 
it would be impossible to make any determination regarding [the 
defendants’] negligence without bringing those essential military 
judgments and decisions under searching judicial scrutiny.  Yet it is 
precisely this kind of scrutiny that the political question doctrine 
forbids.196 
To be fair, the decisions in both Taylor and Carmichael went out of 
their way carefully to explain why the specific claims at issue would 
necessarily bring “military judgments and decisions under searching 
judicial scrutiny.”197  Indeed, the Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded 
the dismissal of analogous cases on the ground that it was not clear 
whether that would inevitably be true.198  Thus, these political 
question cases turn on remarkably narrow terms—claims against 
government contractors arising out of foreign military operations 
                                                 
2011). 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. at 411–12. 
 192. See id. at 411 (assessing the extent to which the government contractor was 
under the military’s control). 
 193. Id. 
 194. Id. at 410. 
 195. 572 F.3d 1271 (11th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 3499 (2010). 
 196. Id. at 1282–83. 
 197. Id. at 1283. 
 198. Lane v. Halliburton, 529 F.3d 548, 565 (5th Cir. 2008). 
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that necessarily implicate particular military decisions. 
At the same time, it is difficult to identify a Supreme Court decision 
endorsing the underlying principle that the political question 
doctrine categorically precludes judicial second-guessing of sensitive 
military judgments and decisions, either directly or insofar as they 
affect the conduct of military contractors.  To the contrary, legion are 
decisions emphasizing that not all cases involving the military are 
barred by the political question doctrine.  Therefore, even if the 
reasoning of these political question decisions is specific and their 
application limited, they still reflect a fundamental misconception of 
the underlying principles.199  Perhaps El-Shifa came closest to a 
convincing explanation—that the concern is with judicial 
interference with the actual conduct of military operations overseas.200  
But if that is the review that the political question doctrine forbids, 
the Taylor and Carmichael courts appear to have skipped a few steps by 
failing to explain in detail how specific combat decisions would 
necessarily be called into question simply by allowing civil litigation to 
go forward. 
Finally, it is worth emphasizing that similar carelessness concerning 
the political question doctrine can be found in non-national security 
decisions by post-September 11 circuit courts, as well.  In Zivotofsky v. 
Secretary of State,201 a divided panel of the D.C. Circuit threw out a 
lawsuit in which U.S. citizen parents sought to enforce their statutory 
right to have the passport of their child born in Jerusalem read 
“Jerusalem, Israel.”  Because the statute conflicts with executive 
branch policy, which does not recognize Jerusalem as the capital of 
Israel, the State Department refused to comply.202  The parents 
promptly sued, only to have their claims thrown out.  Writing for the 
panel majority in the D.C. Circuit, Judge Griffith held that the 
parents’ claims were foreclosed by the political question doctrine 
because the President’s “recognition” power was exclusive, and 
therefore unreviewable.203  Concurring in the judgment, Judge 
Edwards agreed that the President’s recognition power was exclusive, 
                                                 
 199. See, e.g., id. at 562 (determining that the political question doctrine did not 
bar suit against a government contractor, despite its military affiliations, because the 
plaintiffs pled a plausible set of facts regarding fraud and misrepresentation that 
would not require the court to question the Army’s role). 
 200. See El-Shifa Pharm. Indus. Co. v. United States, 607 F.3d 836, 844 (D.C. Cir. 
2010) (en banc) (articulating concerns about the judicial branch second-guessing 
the strategic decision to deploy troops), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 997 (2011). 
 201. 571 F.3d 1227 (D.C. Cir. 2009), vacated, 132 S. Ct. 1421 (2012). 
 202. See id. at 1228–30 (explaining why the political question doctrine extended to 
the Executive’s power to recognize foreign governments). 
 203. Id. at 1231–32. 
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but concluded that, as a result, the statute in question was necessarily 
unconstitutional—not that the courts lacked the power to say so.204 
On certiorari, the Supreme Court agreed with Judge Edwards, 
ruling 8-1 that the political question doctrine did not bar the 
Zivotofsky’s claim.205  As Chief Justice Roberts explained for the 
majority, “determining the constitutionality of § 214(d) involves 
deciding whether the statute impermissibly intrudes upon 
Presidential powers under the Constitution. . . .  Either way [that 
question is answered], the political question doctrine is not 
implicated.”206  In an important and incisive concurrence, Justice 
Sotomayor agreed, elaborating that “it is not whether the evidence 
upon which litigants rely is common to judicial consideration that 
determines whether a case lacks judicially discoverable and 
manageable standards.  Rather, it is whether that evidence in fact 
provides a court a basis to adjudicate meaningfully the issue with 
which it is presented.  The answer will almost always be yes . . . .”207 
Other examples of lower courts overzealously applying the political 
question doctrine after September 11 abound.  But because they run 
the gamut,208 it is difficult to draw conclusions from them other than 
that, as was true before September 11, the lower courts seem far more 
positively disposed toward the political question doctrine than the 
Supreme Court.  To that end, one might dismiss the newfound uses 
of the doctrine in national security cases as further examples of the 
deeper underlying trend.  Yet, the increasingly uncritical view that 
claims implicating almost any military judgments thereby trigger the 
political question doctrine may suggest that, as with the Bivens and 
contractor preemption cases noted above, these decisions constitute a 
new, though modest, departure from extant precedent. 
D. Qualified Immunity 
I have saved the most voluminous body of law for last.  Even 
assuming the existence of a cause of action and the lack of 
categorical defenses to recovery in civil suits arising out of 
                                                 
 204. See id. at 1233–45 (Edwards, J., concurring) (establishing that the political 
question doctrine was inapplicable given the “commonplace” issues of statutory 
construction). 
 205. Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 132 S. Ct. 1421 (2012). 
 206. Id. at 1428. 
 207. Id. at 1435 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment). 
 208. See, e.g., Spectrum Stores, Inc. v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 632 F.3d 938 (5th 
Cir.) (dismissing a class action brought by gasoline retailers alleging that national oil 
production companies were engaged in a price-fixing conspiracy on ground that 
claims were barred by political question doctrine), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 366 (2011). 
VLADECK.OFF.TO.PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)  6/14/2012  7:11 PM 
1326 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61:1295 
counterterrorism or other national security policies, a plaintiff must 
still demonstrate not just that his rights were violated, but that the 
unlawfulness of the defendant’s conduct should have been apparent 
in light of clearly established law.209 As noted above, this was the D.C. 
Circuit’s basis for rejecting liability in Rasul I,210 and one of its two 
bases for doing so in Rasul II.211  In Ashcroft v. al-Kidd,212 the one 
damages suit challenging post-September 11 counterterrorism 
policies in which the Supreme Court has reached the merits, 
qualified immunity was the ultimate ground for denying review.213  In 
light of the novelty of the threat the country has faced and the 
policies the government has undertaken to face that threat, it can 
hardly be surprising that a defense that forecloses liability in cases 
where the law was unsettled has played a particularly central role in 
post-September 11 litigation. 
Still, two developments in qualified immunity jurisprudence bear 
mention.  First, in a case having nothing to do with national security, 
the Supreme Court in Pearson v. Callahan214 unanimously disposed of 
the Saucier sequence in light of practical, procedural, and substantive 
concerns raised by lower court judges.215  As Justice Alito wrote for the 
Court:   
[W]hile the sequence set forth there is often appropriate, it should 
no longer be regarded as mandatory.  The judges of the district 
courts and the courts of appeals should be permitted to exercise 
their sound discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the 
qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first in light of the 
circumstances in the particular case at hand.216 
Although the Court still stressed that the Saucier sequence “is often 
beneficial,”217 such reasoning presupposes that lower courts will waste 
their time reaching holdings that are (1) constitutionally grounded 
and (2) no longer necessary to the result.  Not surprisingly, such 
opinions have been few and far between since Pearson. 
As a result, because qualified immunity will preclude recovery in 
                                                 
 209. See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987) (explaining that it is not 
enough that an action has previously been held to be unlawful; rather, the 
unlawfulness must be apparent). 
 210. See supra note 117 and accompanying text. 
 211. See supra notes 115–116 and accompanying text. 
 212. 131 S. Ct. 2074 (2011). 
 213. See id. at 2083–85 (discussing Ashcroft’s qualified immunity from a potential 
Fourth Amendment violation). 
 214. 555 U.S. 223 (2009). 
 215. Id. at 234–35. 
 216. Id. at 236. 
 217. Id. 
VLADECK.OFF.TO.PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)  6/14/2012  7:11 PM 
2012] THE NEW NATIONAL SECURITY CANON 1327 
cases raising novel challenges to governmental counterterrorism 
policies (whether because the policy is novel or because the plaintiff’s 
legal claim is), the practical effect of Pearson is that such novelty will 
seldom be disturbed.  For example, suppose a plaintiff challenged a 
novel governmental policy as applied to him at T0.  At T1, the relevant 
court decides that the defendant is entitled to qualified immunity 
because the unlawfulness of his conduct was not apparent in light of 
clearly established law.  Under Saucier, that holding would come 
alongside judicial articulation of the relevant law going forward 
(including perhaps a holding that the policy is unlawful).  Under 
Pearson it likely will not.  If a different plaintiff is now subjected to the 
same treatment at T2, qualified immunity will again bar recovery at T3.  
In contrast, if the court at T1 had articulated a forward-looking rule as 
Saucier required, then the law would have been clearly established at 
T2 such that the plaintiff should now be able to recover at T3.
218 
A good example of this problem in practice is Jose Padilla’s Bivens 
suit against John Yoo, alleging that the opinions Yoo wrote while 
serving in the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel directly 
contributed to Padilla’s mistreatment while in military custody.  In 
May 2012, the Ninth Circuit dismissed Padilla’s suit based on its 
conclusion that Yoo was entitled to qualified immunity.219  In 
particular, the Ninth Circuit so held because (1) it was not clearly 
established from 2001 to 2003 that “cruel, inhuman, or degrading 
treatment” (CIDT) shocks the conscience; and (2) it was similarly not 
clearly established during the same time period whether the specific 
mistreatment Padilla alleged was torture (which did clearly shock the 
conscience) or CIDT.  And yet, despite its detailed analysis of the 
state of the law from 2001 to 2003, and its apparent recognition of 
how close a case Padilla’s was, the panel pretermitted its analysis after 
holding that the relevant law was not clearly established between 2001 
and 2003, expressly invoking Pearson as justifying its decision to set no 
precedent going forward about the state of the law today.220 
Of course, this problem is hardly confined to national security 
cases.221  As the Padilla litigation demonstrates, however, what 
                                                 
 218. For more on this problem, see Stephen I. Vladeck, AEDPA, Saucier, and the 
Stronger Case for Rights-First Constitutional Adjudication, 32 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 595 
(2009) (articulating how Saucier could be utilized in post-conviction habeas corpus 
cases). 
 219. Padilla v. Yoo, No. 09-16478, 2012 WL 1526156 (9th Cir. May 2, 2012). 
 220. Id. at *15 n.16 (“We have discretion to decide which of the two prongs of 
qualified immunity analysis to address first. Here, we consider only the second 
prong.” (citation omitted)). 
 221. See, e.g., Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 432 (2007) (Breyer, J., concurring 
in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (stating he “would end the failed 
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separates national security litigation in this context is the absence of 
other opportunities for the articulation of forward-looking 
constitutional principles.  Whereas ordinary First, Fourth, Fifth, and 
Eighth Amendment claims can arise in a number of contexts other 
than suits for retrospective relief (e.g., in suits for prospective relief 
or as defenses to criminal prosecutions), there are a vanishingly small 
set of challenges to national security policies that will be justiciable in 
those contexts.222  Thus, the general rule articulated in Pearson will 
wreak particular havoc in the national security context, potentially 
freezing (or, at a minimum, substantially slowing) the development 
of constitutional law with regard to the surveillance, detention, and 
treatment of terrorism suspects.223 
The second development is less about the order of battle than the 
substance of qualified immunity analysis.  Although courts have 
historically applied qualified immunity with relative evenhandedness 
to government officers at all levels of service, a provocative 
concurrence by Justice Kennedy in the al-Kidd case suggests that this 
might perhaps be incorrect in national security litigation.224  As he 
there explained:   
A national officeholder intent on retaining qualified immunity 
need not abide by the most stringent standard adopted anywhere 
in the United States . . . [or] guess at when a relatively small set of 
appellate precedents have established a binding legal rule.  If 
national officeholders were subject to personal liability whenever 
they confronted disagreement among appellate courts, those 
officers would be deterred from full use of their legal authority.  
The consequences of that deterrence must counsel caution by the 
Judicial Branch, particularly in the area of national security . . . .  
[N]ationwide security operations should not have to grind to a halt 
even when an appellate court finds those operations 
unconstitutional.  The doctrine of qualified immunity does not so 
constrain national officeholders entrusted with urgent 
responsibilities.225 
To be sure, Justice Kennedy was writing only for himself in this 
passage.  Still, if this is more than just a fleeting observation, it might 
suggest that unique national security concerns do play (and perhaps 
                                                 
Saucier experiment now” in a high school freedom of speech case). 
 222. See, e.g., Al Shimari v. CACI Int’l, Inc., 658 F.3d 413, 419 (4th Cir. 2011) 
(suggesting that the very purposes of tort law conflict with the pursuit of warfare), 
vacated, No. 10-1891, 2012 WL 1656773 (4th Cir. May 11, 2012) (en banc). 
 223. See Vladeck, supra note 11, at 275–78. 
 224. See Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2086–87 (2011) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring). 
 225. Id. at 2087 (citations omitted). 
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have been playing) a role in judicial assessment of qualified 
immunity.  At a minimum, Justice Kennedy’s concurrence suggests 
that at least some jurists are far more willing to find no liability in 
national security cases than they would in non-national security cases 
raising comparable constitutional claims.  Unless such holdings were 
based on the conclusion that the substantive law was different in the 
national security context, it would be hard to see how they could be 
consistent with the broader understanding of immunity doctrine. 
CONCLUSION:  TAKING STOCK OF THE NEW NATIONAL SECURITY 
CANON 
Whatever its full contours, the above analysis has hopefully been 
persuasive as to the existence of a new national security canon—a 
body of jurisprudence in which distinct (and sometimes poorly 
articulated) national security concerns have prompted courts to 
disfavor relief, even when either:  (1) relief should otherwise have 
been available; or (2) other settled (and topically neutral) doctrines 
would likely have foreclosed relief in any event.  Thus, where federal 
officer defendants are concerned, courts have relied heavily on the 
absence of Bivens remedies, with qualified immunity as an available 
fallback.  And where the defendants are private contractors operating 
under color of federal law, the Bivens cases have focused on the 
availability of state-law remedies, whereas the state-law tort cases have 
focused on the unique federal interest justifying preemption.  
Ultimately, given the heads-we-win, tails-you-lose quality to this body 
of decision-making, it is difficult to rebut the conclusion that, at least 
at the circuit level, more is going on than just faithful application of 
existing precedent.  The question then becomes what to make of this 
development. 
In the short-term, this jurisprudential pattern suggests that victims 
of governmental overreaching in the conduct of national security 
policy will primarily have to turn to the political branches for redress, 
since retrospective judicial remedies will likely be unavailing.  Such a 
development might put only that much more pressure on the 
growing body of scholarship suggesting that, especially during 
national security crises, meaningful checks and balances can be 
found internally within the Executive Branch.  As significantly, such 
case law might eventually force the Supreme Court to reassert its role 
in these cases in a manner that gives these newfound doctrinal 
accommodations a far narrower compass than they might otherwise 
enjoy.  Indeed, given that most of the case law identified in Part II 
arises out of a minority of jurisdictions (the Second, Fourth, 
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Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits), one response might be that these 
circuits are merely outliers whose extreme views have distorted the 
state of play. 
But if what in fact has taken place over the last decade is a 
testament to a longer-term pattern, one that neither the political 
branches nor the Supreme Court disrupt in the near future, then we 
must confront a more alarming possibility:  that as these “national 
security”-based exceptions increasingly become the rule in 
contemporary civil litigation against government officers—whether 
with regard to new “special factors” under Bivens, new bases for 
contractor preemption under Boyle, proliferation of the political 
question doctrine, or even more expansive reliance upon the 
qualified immunity defense—the line between the unique national 
security justifications giving rise to these cases and ordinary civil 
litigation will increasingly blur.  Thus, wherever one comes down on 
the virtues and vices of this new national security canon, perhaps the 
most important point to take away is the need to carefully cabin its 
scope.  Otherwise, exceptions articulated in the guise of such unique 
fact patterns could serve more generally to prevent civil liability for 
government misconduct and to thereby dilute the effectiveness of 
judicial review as a deterrent for any and all unlawful government 
action—not just those actions undertaken in ostensibly in defense of 
the nation. 
